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Secure Authentication Protocol for Mobile Payment
Kai Fan , Hui Li, Wei Jiang, Chengsheng Xiao, and Yintang Yang
Abstract: With the increasing popularity of fintech, i.e., financial technology, the e-commerce market has grown
rapidly in the past decade, such that mobile devices enjoy unprecedented popularity and are playing an everincreasing role in e-commerce. This is especially true of mobile payments, which are attracting increasing attention.
However, the occurrence of many traditional financial mishaps has exposed the challenges inherent in online
authentication technology that is based on traditional modes of realizing the healthy and stable development of
mobile payment. In addition, this technology ensures user account security and privacy. In this paper, we propose
a Secure Mutual Authentication Protocol (SMAP) based on the Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) protocol for mobile
payment. To guarantee reliable service, we use an asymmetric cryptosystem for achieving mutual authentication
between the server and client, which can resist fake servers and forged terminals. Compared to the modes currently
used, the proposed protocol strengthens the security of user account information as well as individual privacy
throughout the mobile-payment transaction process. Practical application has proven the security and convenience
of the proposed protocol.
Key words: mutual authentication; security; privacy; Universal 2nd Factor (U2F); mobile payment
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Introduction

The Internet has dramatically changed the face of
the world. In this era, the Internet provides a variety
of convenient services for individuals anywhere and
anytime[1] , having completely changed our daily
lives, our ways of thinking, and the way we
understand the world. With the development of mobile
communication technology over time, many mobile
Internet applications have become popular, thereby
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making us more informed and our activities more
portable. In the mobile Internet field, the mobile
phone has an indispensable role, and has become an
inseparable life accessory for most individuals. Mobile
phones maintain personal information and are used for
both traditional communication as well as to interact
in new ways with people and things[2] . In addition,
commerce is a necessary element of social stability
and constitutes an inevitable part of our daily lives.
The combination of smart phones and mobile Internet
technology has effectively upgraded traditional offline
transactions into networked, mobile, and more efficient
exchanges. Statistics reported by China’s central bank
show that in 2016, Japan’s GDP was about 4.37
trillion dollars, whereas in China, mobile payments
soared from 85.82 trillion yuan to 99.27 trillion yuan
(about 14.1 trillion dollars). This indicates that mobile
payment is becoming a mainstream payment method
that is profoundly affecting the way we live.
China skipped over the era of credit card payment
to directly enter the mobile-payment era, and is the
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world leader in the mobile-payment field. In China,
as well as in some other countries where financial
technology (fintech) applications are well developed,
there are many mobile payment scenarios occurring as
routine aspect of daily life. People can pay for water
and electricity, public trips, online shopping, and many
other things by mobile-payment methods. In addition
to more typical application scenarios, mobile Internet
financial transactions are more numerous in China
than elsewhere. Other popular scenarios include the
sharing of bicycles and giving electronic red envelopes
(i.e., monetary gifts). Science and technology are
important driving forces of social progress. Compared
with traditional payment methods, mobile payment has
the following features:
(1) Digital transmission. Mobile payment uses
advanced technology to digitally transmit financial
transaction information, whereas the traditional
payment method requires payment via the transfer of
cash, notes, or bank statement.
(2) Open payment environment. The mobilepayment environment operates from an open system
platform, whereas the traditional payment system
operates in a relatively closed system.
(3) Advanced means of communication. In mobile
payment, the demands on hardware and software
resources are high, but traditional payment uses
traditional communication media, which are less
demanding.
(4) Other economic advantages. Mobile payment is
convenient, fast, and efficient. Users simply use a
networked tablet computer or mobile phone, thereby
enjoying fewer geographical restrictions and the ability
to complete the entire payment process in a very short
period of time. Traditional payments, in contrast,
involve cumbersome procedures and can be timeconsuming.
Some organizations in China and other countries
have defined mobile payment as follows: a transaction
payment process whereby the payer uses mobile
communication technology and mobile devices to
initialize, authorize, or complete payment[3] . Compared
with that of the past, the number of mobile phone users
has skyrocketed, as has the number of accounts. Mobile
payment, as a new kind of network financial service,
is attracting increasing attention from researchers[4] .
Moreover, with the emergence of mobile applications
like Alipay and WeChat in China, mobile payment
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has entered a period of rapid development, and is
greatly facilitating the activities of daily life, as well
as spawning new Internet financial enterprises. In the
United States, companies like Facebook have also
begun to get involved in this field. With the gradual
implementation of this concept over time, mobile
payments will spread to more areas and be used by
many more people. While mobile payment is popular
because of its many advantages, unfortunately, it also
faces many threats and security challenges. Mobile
transactions face a range of security issues, such as
the reliability of the transactions, the confidentiality
of the data, the non-repudiation of transactions, and
data integrity[5] . In many parts of the world today,
no standardized programs have been established for
mobile payments. To ensure payment reliability, the
trading environment must be reliable and the transaction
object must be true. Confidentiality of data refers to
the protection of the privacy of transaction information.
In addition, the transaction itself must be undeniable,
which means that the participants are also undeniable,
whereas data integrity refers to the prevention of
malicious changes being made to the data during the
transmission process.
A number of fraud problems have occasionally arisen
with mobile payments in recent years, which seriously
undermine the user experience. To a certain extent,
fraud will also work against the popularity of the
technology. More importantly, some security issues
may provide opportunities for theft, thereby making the
user vulnerable to huge financial losses due to mobilepayment security issues. The occurrence of such events
also increases the burden on society. It is clear that
security in the payment system is a major problem
that must be solved. Our work in this study mainly
focuses on the security of mobile-payment systems. To
ensure the security of the online trading environment,
we propose a Secure Mutual Authentication Protocol
(SMAP) that plays an important role in the payment
process. We note that traditional physical authentication
devices such as USB keys[6] , or similar devices
produced by different organizations and which provide
no unified interface standard, result in individuals
carrying a variety of authentication devices, which is
not only inconvenient but also full of risk. Our proposed
protocol is based on the Universal 2nd Factor (U2F),
which is an open standard that supports all certification
services that meet these standards. In fact, a growing
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number of Internet services are beginning to support the
two-step certification standard, which can identify and
reject forged servers and counterfeit users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we review related work on mobile payment
and its security issues. In Section 3, we propose the
SMAP architecture based on U2F. We present our
security analysis and performance simulation results
for the protocol in Section 4. Finally, we draw our
conclusions in Section 5.

2

Related Work

Mobile payment has been a growing trend in
recent decades with the booming development of
communication technologies like 4G. Users can
purchase almost anything they desire online via their
mobile phones, such that mobile payments have become
incorporated into many aspects of daily life. Today,
in Hangzhou, China, commuters can travel by bus or
subway using only their phones[7] . Customers can buy
anything they wish in supermarkets like Wal-Mart via
QR code payment[8] . In addition, people can also use
their phones to perform many of their daily activities,
such as buying a film ticket, purchasing a cup of
coffee online, or paying an automobile court fine[9] . As
such, the mobile-payment process has become a very
important part of e-commerce, and has developed into a
convenient and relatively reliable technology.
In fact, to some extent, mobile payment has improved
everyone’s lives in most every sphere of activity. Several
years ago, USB key technology became mainstream in
the network transaction field, and people began using it
for online shopping. In 2011, Yu[10] proposed a solution
using the USB key for the network authentication
process. On this basis, in 2012, Wang[6] proposed
another online identification approach for payment
that improved efficiency and feasibility. However, the
authentication phase remains risky, as Trojans can be
implanted into the USB key, which lead to differences
in the transaction information between the computer
and USB device. This means that the Trojans have
falsified the transaction information, since the USB
device is only responsible for providing a signature
for the transaction data, never for distinguishing this
information. In addition, different kinds of USB devices
have provided various interfaces with no uniform
standard, and the standards for USB devices vary
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between banks. Moreover, it is troublesome to carry
USB devices, which are easily lost. Today, due to its
lack of security and portability, USB devices are slowly
withdrawing from the technology development stage.
As noted above, China skipped over the credit
card payment phase and went directly to mobile
payments. However, credit cards remain a widespread
way for individuals to pay in developed and developing
countries. In the United States, for instance, credit cards
continue to be the main payment tool. However, the
credit card involves substantial risk, being vulnerable
to untrustworthy credit card readers or a skimming
devices[11] . Recently, there have been many credit card
attacks. For instance, as reported by the New York
Times in October 2012, attackers stole customers’
credit card information at 63 Barnes & Noble book
stores by hacking the credit card readers[12] . As a
traditional payment method, credit card payments lack
security, and, to a certain extent, are not consistent
with the trend of scientific and technological progress
in digitization or even social development.
Nowadays, mobile payment methods are becoming
more popular due to their convenience, time
saving, and personalization. For example, NearField Communication (NFC) technology, a wireless
proximity technology operating at 13.56 MHz[13] , is
convenient for booking travel tickets. NFC technology
offers several features for mobile handsets, such as
hand-free charging and fast matching[7] . With the
booming development of mobile payment, NFC is now
widely used in public traffic systems and supermarkets
in Hangzhou, China. In addition, with the success and
popularity of the O2O mode, QR code payment now
has a wide range of applications. QR code requires
the use of equipment for scanning. The most common
method is for a mobile device with a fixed camera or
scanner to read the QR code, after which the user can
complete the payment via the device[14] . Today, many
applications support the recognition of a QR code,
including Alipay, WeChat, UC Browser, OFO, and
Mobike, shown in Fig. 1.
However, mobile payment can be a double-edged
sword[15] . For example, in the interaction process
with NFC, the radio-frequency signal is easily hijacked.
If a phone with an NFC function happens to be
located close to a bank card, it can read the
card number, some of the identifying information,
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Fig. 1

Architecture of mobike.

and even some transaction records without inputting
any authentication information. For consumers, NFC
payment is convenient and fast, but brings with a
security risk, in that it can lead to the disclosure of
information contained in consumers’ bank cards. In
addition, QR code payment also has some weaknesses,
such as its vulnerability to dirt and damage. If stained
or tarnished, mobile devices cannot read the QR code.
Also, currently, some QR code reading tools cannot
recognize malicious websites or intercept risky URLs,
which leads to the proliferation of mobile phone viruses
and the potential for huge financial loss to the consumer.
Since mobile phones have been embedded with the
Universal Identification Module (USIM) card, they
have become the most widespread mobile device ever
used. Global telecom operators, without exception, are
engaged in mobile-payment services for an increasing
number of electronic payment markets. In this paper,
we propose a protocol, SMAP, for use in mobile
payments, which embeds a secure working environment
in the USIM card that enhances the privacy and security
of users.
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to address. The FIDO standard represents the best
innovative mobile identity authentication practice in the
industry, and can provide a good solution to the above
problems, by “separating the authentication mode
and authentication protocol, and taking advantage of
hardware equipment capabilities that can be embedded
with security modules, they can ensure the same level of
support for the different authentication methods utilized
by various devices and applications”[16] . In July 2012,
the FIDO Union was nominally established, with six
initial companies involved: PayPal, Lenovo, Nok Nok
Labs, Validity Sensors, Infineon, and Agnitio. Today,
more than two hundred companies or enterprises
have membership, including Alibaba, Google, and
RSA. In December 2014, FIDO launched its technical
specification version 1.0, which includes a Universal
Authentication Framework (UAF) standard that uses
no password, and a U2F standard that provides a “twofactor experience” (passwords and specific devices),
as shown in Fig. 2. In addition to solving a range of
identity authentication problems, FIDO also addresses
problems with the traditional mobile authentication
method being too centralized and inconvenient to input,
with respect to the password or SMS authentication
code.
3.1.2

Passwordless UX

The passwordless FIDO experience is supported by the
UAF protocol, in which users register their devices with
the online service by selecting a local authentication

SMAP

3.1
3.1.1

Fast IDentity Online (FIDO)
Introduction of FIDO

Biometric identification technologies, including
fingerprint, face, and iris recognition, are becoming
increasingly mature, whereas mobile identity
authentication technologies are tending to diversify.
At the same time, mobile devices are fragmented,
as are their interfaces, because there is no unified
authentication protocol that is compatible with the
range of authentication methods. Problems like
compatibility are becoming more and more difficult

Fig. 2

UAF and U2F standards.
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mechanism, e.g., swiping a finger, looking at the
camera, speaking into the microphone, or entering a
PIN. The UAF protocol allows the service to select
which mechanisms are offered to the user. Once
registered, users simply repeat the local authentication
action whenever they need to authenticate a transaction
for the service. This dispenses with the need to enter
a password when authenticating a transaction from
that device. The UAF also allows the combination
of multiple authentication mechanisms, such as a
fingerprint + PIN.
3.1.3

The second-factor FIDO experience is supported by the
U2F protocol, which allows online services to augment
the security of their existing password infrastructure
by adding a strong second factor to the user login
process. With U2F, the user logs in with a username
and password as before, and the service can also
prompt the user to present a second-factor identification
at any time. The strong second factor allows the
service to simplify its passwords (e.g., 4-digit PIN)
without compromising security. During registration and
authentication, the user presents the second factor by
simply pressing a button on a USB device or tapping
over NFC. Users can use their FIDO U2F devices for
all online services that support the protocol to leverage
the built-in support in web browsers, and websites can
simplify the required password when a user carries a
U2F device with built-in support in the web browser.
3.2

Fig. 3

U2F protocol

Proposed SMAP

In mobile payments, online certification plays a vital
role in ensuring a safe payment environment for users.
In this section, to address the security and convenience
issues of mobile payments, we present a SMAP that
is based on the theory of the U2F mechanism to
achieve secure authentication between the user and
website. Figure 3 shows the overall workflow of the
proposed protocol architecture. The precondition for
the smooth operation of this protocol is that the U2F
device has built-in support in web browsers. We use
an asymmetric cryptosystem in this SMAP during the
mutual authentication between mobile terminals (e.g.,
a mobile phone) and the website. The protocol is
divided into two phases—online registration and online
certification. During registration with an online service,
the user’s client device (mobile phone) creates a new
key pair. A private key is retained in the device locally
and a public key is registered in the website with

Proposed protocol architecture.

the online service. Authentication is performed by the
client device—it proves to the service that it possesses
the private key by signing a challenge sent from the
website. The client’s private key can be used only after
it is unlocked locally on the device by the user. That
is, only a valid user can access the private key, which is
guaranteed via the successful authentication exchange
between the user and the device. The local unlock is
accomplished by a user-friendly and secure action such
as swiping a finger, entering a PIN, inserting a secondfactor device, or pressing a button.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the authentication process
in this system is mutual. In the mobile-payment
environment, this intact protocol has two steps:
registration and authentication. The first can be
regarded as an initialization step, which provides a
channel for both the server and user to store some
cryptographic information for use in the next phase.
Cryptography is used in the authentication process to
ensure the reliability of both the server and client,
thereby guaranteeing security[17] . In addition, a Secure
Element (SE) is embedded in the USIM card, which is
responsible for identification and computation.
3.2.1

Notation

Before introducing the details of the workflow, we first
explain the notations used, as shown in Table 1.
3.2.2

Registration phase

In this phase, the user must choose an available
U2F authenticator that is compatible with the online
service’s acceptance policy. Then, the user unlocks the
U2F authenticator to reach a mobile client using a
fingerprint reader, a button on a second-factor device,
a securely entered PIN, or other similar method. An
asymmetric cryptosystem is used, as noted above, for
the user’s device to create a new public/private key pair
that is unique to the local device, the online server,

Kai Fan et al.: Secure Authentication Protocol for Mobile Payment
Table 1

The summary of the notations used in the scheme.

Notation
Fingerprint
PIN
K1
K2
Kd
RN
M0
M1
M2
Cs
Sm
XOR
H()

Description
Fingerprint identification
PIN code
Private key
Public key
Key handle used for searching K2
A random number generated by the device
Transaction information
Payment data
Transaction result
Challenge value generated by the server
Signature value operated by the device
Bitwise xor operation
Hash operation

and the user’s account. The public key is sent to the
online service (website) and is associated with the user’s
account. The private key and any information regarding
the local authentication method (such as biometric
measurements) will always remain in the device. The
integrated registration procedure, as shown in Fig. 4,
involves the following interactive steps:
(1) User mobile phone: Establishes an identification
between the user and the mobile device with a
fingerprint, PIN, or other similar method.
(2) Mobile phone: The USIM card with the
embedded SE module in the mobile device generates
a pair of keys .K1 ; K2 / for the local device and the
online server. And then the SE module creates the
Kd . A hash value of h1 D H.K2 ; Kd / is locally
computed.
(3) Mobile phone server: The mobile phone stores
the private key in the local device and sends the
public key, the key handle, and their hash values to
the server.
(4) Server: At this end, the K2 and Kd are
stored, then the server computes the hash value
h2 D H.K2 ; Kd /, and conducts an XOR operation
Mobile device
(USIM-SE)

User

Server

Fingerprint, PIN
(Identiﬁcation) Generate a key
pair: (K1, K2)
Generate Kd
Compute
h1=H(K2, Kd)
Display ACK

Fig. 4

Registration
success

K2, Kd
h1
ACK

Registration phase.

Compute
h2=H(K2, Kd)
Check
h1⊕h2=0?
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using h1 . If the result is not zero, this indicates
that the information sent from the mobile device
to the server has been changed, so the registration
fails. Otherwise, the registration is successful and the
server sends an acknowledgment (ACK) response to
the mobile device.
(5) User mobile phone: Upon viewing the ACK
response, the user unlocks the device using one of
the methods listed above.
In this registration phase, as shown in Fig. 4, we
can see that all the preparatory work is completed and
ready for the next phase. The first step guarantees that
the user can access the mobile device by the way of
fingerprint or PIN code. The public key K2 , which is
sent to the server and pertains to the user’s account Kd ,
is used for searching K2 based on the private key K1 .
At the server end, the binary XOR operation between
the calculated hash value h2 and the received hash value
h1 ensures that the data sent from the mobile device to
the server is secure. If the result of the XOR operation
is zero, this means that the values h1 and h2 are equal,
which indicates that the registration keys have not been
falsified. If ok, the ACK response is sent to the mobile
device and is displayed to the user. At this point, the
registration has been completed smoothly.
3.2.3 Authentication phase
If the user wants to utilize an online payment service for
the first time, the registration phase is an indispensable
first step. Some relevant information will be sent
to the user’s own account during this procedure. In
addition, if the user wants to be assured of a good
online shopping experience, the certification process is
necessary and will play an important role. This process
involves the use of the asymmetric cryptosystem
mechanism to perform information exchange, as well as
a mutual authentication process, in which user-initiated
transaction information and the online payment
service information are strictly compared. When their
consistency is confirmed, only then will payment occur.
If the information is inconsistent, this indicates that the
transaction has been tampered with, and the user can
directly end the transaction. This certification process
is effective for helping users to avoid phishing sites. As
shown in Fig. 5, the authentication process is divided
into six steps.
When registration is complete, the private key is
stored in the SE module in the mobile device, whereas
the public key and key handle are stored in the online
server. When a user performs an online mobile
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Mobile dervice
(USIM-SE)
K1

User

Transaction
demand M0

Request
Generate RN

Display M1
Compare M0
with M1

Store Cs

Request, RN Store RN, analyze
the request, and
[Step 1]
compute payment
data M1
Cs, M1
[Step 2]

[Step 3]
Unlock

Server
K2 Kd

Verify Cs
Generate
signature SM

Generate
challenge Cs

SM

Check SM with K2
searched by Kd
Generate transaction
result M2, compute
H(RN)⊕M2
Transaction Display M2
Compute H(RN)
H(RN)⊕M2
success
[Step
5]
[Step 6]
Get M2 by
H(RN)⊕H(RN)
⊕M2

Fig. 5

[Step 4]

Authentication phase.

payment, the entire transaction also comprises six steps,
the details of which are as follows:
Step 1 The user initiates an online transaction by
sending a request to the mobile device. Based on this
request, the mobile device (USIM-SE) generates a
Random Number (RN) locally, and then sends both the
request and the RN to the server.
Step 2 After receiving and storing the RN, the
server analyzes the transaction request, transforms it
into payment data, and computes it correctly, which is
denoted as M1. Next, the server generates a challenge
Cs based on the public key K1 that had been stored
earlier during registration. Then, the server sends the
challenge Cs and the M1 to the mobile device.
Step 3 Cs is stored in mobile device (USIM-SE).
The payment data M1 is displayed to the user via a
popup or other similar method on the screen. Based on
the M1, the user can compare the payment data with
the previous transaction information M0 created by the
user’s own demand. If they do not match, this indicates
that the transaction request has been falsified, so the
user can stop the transaction to avoid any financial loss
from a wrong payment. However, if M1 matches M0,
this confirms that the transaction data is unchanged and
the transaction payment data is correct, so the user can
unlock the SE by fingerprint, simplified PIN code, or
other similar method.
Step 4 After being unlocked by a valid user, the SE
will verify the challenge Cs previously stored locally.
Then, the SE generates a signature SM with the local
private key K1 to respond to the challenge Cs and the
SM will be sent to the server.
Step 5 The server searches the public key K2 based
on the key handle Kd , and uses it to verify the
signature SM . If successful, the server will generate the

transaction result, denoted by M2, then compute the
value H.RN/ ˚ M2 and send it to the mobile device
(USIM-SE).
Step 6 Compute H.RN/ with the local RN in SE, and
obtain the M2 by H.RN/ ˚ H.RN/ ˚ M2. Then, the
mobile device displays the M2 transaction result to the
user. The authentication process is then complete and
the whole transaction has been smoothly executed.
From the steps described above, we know that the
private key K1 is stored in the SE module and the
public key K2 in the server. These keys are never
transferred to the other ends in any form, plaintext or
ciphertext. In Step 3, the user compares M1 with M0
to determine whether the transaction information has
been falsified. Verification is conducted several times
by the user, mobile device, and server, which ensures
that no transaction information has been falsified. In
addition, the validity of the user is confirmed in Step
3 by the unique biological fingerprint or simplified PIN
code. This ensures that only the user can unlock the SE.
The security of the communication channel between the
server and mobile device is safeguarded through the
mechanism of the asymmetric cryptosystem. Therefore,
this system architecture works well in defending against
phishing sites.

4

Security
Analysis
Evaluation

and

Practical

In this section, we analyze and evaluate the proposed
protocol. To our knowledge, there have as yet been
no similar payment U2F-based architectures reported
with respect to mobile payment. Therefore, in lieu of
conducting a comparative analysis of the performance
of our proposed protocol with that of others, we
evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol
architecture itself with our simulation experiment
results.
4.1

Security analysis

Of the various payment modes available, mobile
payment is becoming increasingly popular and
accepted, especially in China. Due to its superior
convenience and ongoing advances, mobile payment is
expected to be the main payment method throughout
the world in the future. From Fig. 3, we can see that
many advanced technologies will utilized in the field
of mobile payment, including biotechnologies, such as
the existing fingerprint, iris, and face identifications.
Mobile payment is a developing megatrend. With
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respect to our proposed protocol, to ensure that the
user is the valid owner of the mobile device, as shown
in Fig. 3, we can see that the SE module embedded
in the USIM card in the mobile phone is locked by
default, and the user unlocks the mobile phone with a
fingerprint, PIN code, or other similar method. In this
protocol, we developed the SE module into a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE), which is responsible
for the cryptography computation.
During the registration phase, the user unlocks the
SE, and the SE generates a new key pair .K1 ; K2 /
and a key handle for searching the server. The private
key K1 is stored locally in the SE module and the
public key K2 is kept in the server. These keys are
never transferred out, even in the authentication phase,
which means that intruders cannot obtain the key pair
by any method. In this procedure, the server checks
h2 with h1 to ensure that received K2 as well as Kd
is right, and that the communication channel between
the mobile device and server has not been invaded. The
whole transaction process takes place without inputting
any username or password to the server, so the user’s
account information cannot be revealed. Therefore, the
proposed protocol performs well with respect to privacy
protection and the security of the key pair and user
account.
In the authentication phase shown in Fig. 5, when a
user launches a transaction request, an RN is generated
in the SE, which is used in Steps 1 and 5. This RN
must be regenerated when the next round of the online
transaction is conducted, so even if this random number
is obtained illegally, it cannot be used in the future
transaction for verifying the transaction information
in Step 5. Therefore, to some extent, this proposed
protocol is capable of anti-replay[18] .
Another popular mobile-payment approach is based
on the fact that many QR code readers cannot recognize
malicious URLs[19] when using QR payment, which
puts the financial security of users at great risk.
However, we use an asymmetric cryptosystem in this
payment architecture, which can ensure the authenticity
of the entities (i.e., user, mobile device, and server)
throughout the transaction. By verifying the challenge
sent from the server to the SE end, and checking the
signature generated by the SE at the server end, the
reliabilities of the server and user are guaranteed. If
the verifications and comparison by the mobile device
regarding the challenge fail, this shows that the server
is fake, so the user can abandon the transaction and the
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payment by the mobile phone will be stopped. In the
opposite case, by authenticating the signature from the
mobile phone, the server can also guarantee the validity
of the user because only the valid user can unlock the
SE and have the SE generate a signature. As such, the
mutual authentication protocol is anti-counterfeit, and
can ensure the security of the user’s account.
In Fig. 5, we can see that the user makes a transaction
request when a need arises. When the payment data
is displayed on the mobile device after three steps,
the user can check that it matches the initial request.
When they are verified as consistent, only then will the
transaction be executed. The purpose of the comparison
is to ascertain whether the communication data has been
intentionally falsified. In the opposite case, if they are
different, this means that the data have been changed
and the user can then refuse the transaction to avoid any
wrongful payment. In this way, this protocol solves the
problem of forged and altered information.
4.2

Practical evaluation

As discussed earlier, recognition may fail to occur when
a QR code has been tarnished or stained, and contactless
cognition technology also places a high demand on
the system’s software and hardware. In contrast, in
the proposed mutual authentication protocol, the SE
embedded in the USIM card functions as a TEE that
is responsible for cryptography computation. This TEE
exists only in the mobile phone, which no one can take
away or destroy. In addition, almost all the operations
are online, so no external physical damage will affect it.
Not only does the proposed protocol perform well
with respect to security, it also exhibits good operating
performance. In light of the lack of research studies
based on U2F in the mobile payment field, we
performed a simulation analysis on the basis of our
experimental results, rather than any comparative
analysis. Throughout the authentication procedure, the
experiment data regarding time consumption, which
mainly focused on the asymmetric cryptosystem, shows
the protocol performance to be good.
In Step 4 in Fig. 5, we can see that the server
generates a challenge Cs using the public key K2 , as
shown in Fig. 6.
The SE module is a trusted execution environment.
After receiving the challenge Cs , the SE module
addresses it and generates a signature in response. In
our experiment, we conducted this partial procedure
more than 60 times. The time consumed by this phase
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Challenge operation.

Time consumption (s)

each time was random to a certain degree, as shown in
Fig. 7, with the scattergrams being decentralized over a
range from 1.05 s to 1.15 s. Despite this result, the time
consumption in Fig. 7 shows that most scattergrams
float up and down in 1.1 s. Compared to the sequence of
our experiments, the Matlab simulation result showed
an average time consumption for generating a signature
in the SE module of about 1.11 s, as indicated by the
black solid line in the graph. This means that the time
cost for the SE to verify the challenge and generate
a signature is about 1.11 s, which represents a time
savings, relatively speaking.
Next, we simulated and analyzed the time consumed
in Step 4. In Fig. 5, we can see that, in Step 4, the
server verifies the signature SM using the stored public
key K2 searched by the key handle Kd , as illustrated
in Fig. 8. We performed this part of the procedure
more than 9000 times, the results of which are shown
in Fig. 9. From these results, we can see that with
increased authentication times, the time consumption
increases almost linearly overall.
In Fig. 9, the black line indicates the practical
experiment simulation results, and the red line the
simulation average, most of which overlap. According
to these experiment data, the slope of the red line is
0.003, which means that the time cost of the server
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Time cost of verifying the signature in server.

authentication of the signature using the stored public
key is calculated in about 3 milliseconds. In general,
we can conclude that the mutual authentication process
occurs fast, which makes for a successful mobilepayment experience. More importantly, it is also much
safer. In today’s world, time is a valuable resource
and security plays a vital role in a pleasant payment
experience. The proposed protocol we have presented
in this article performs well with respect to both time
cost and security. In addition, with the further rapid
development of mobile fintech, the relationship between
mobile devices and users is becoming closer, especially
in this age of artificial intelligence. As a vital accessory,
the mobile device is very portable and has become
an unconscious addition to our everyday lives. As it
becomes even more convenient and safe to use mobile
devices in mobile fintech, the use of mobile payments
will continue to flourish.

5

Conclusion

With the rapid evolution of mobile-payment technology,
modes for making mobile payments will be increasingly
popular. As noted above, mobile payment can be
a double-edged sword. On one hand, it provides
convenience in almost every respect to its users, such
as for traveling, shopping, and paying fees. On the
other hand, hostile attacks can harm the user account
and result in great financial loss. In this paper, we
found the proposed SMAP to work well in protecting
the security of the user’s account and improving the
payment experience with low time consumption. In
addition, this protocol architecture is based on U2F,
which provides a unified payment model, with no need
for the use of various payment tools, which will greatly
contribute to the development of payment technology.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the National Key R&D

Kai Fan et al.: Secure Authentication Protocol for Mobile Payment

Program of China (No. 2017YFB0802600), the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61772403
and U1401251), the Natural Science Basic Research
Plan in Shaanxi Province of China (No. 2017JM6004),
and National 111 Program of China (Nos. B16037 and
B08038).

References
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

J. C. Liou and S. Bhashyam, A feasible and cost effective
two-factor authentication for online transactions, in Proc.
2nd Int. Software Engineering and Data Mining Conf.,
Chengdu, China, 2010, pp. 47–51.
S. Nseir, N. Hirzallah, and M. Aqel, A secure mobile
payment system using QR code, in Proc. 5th Int. Computer
Science and Information Technology Conf., Amman,
Jordan, 2013, pp. 111–114.
Z. Sahnoune, E. Aı̈meur, G. E. Haddad, and R.
Sokoudjou, Watch your mobile payment: An empirical
study of privacy disclosure, in Proc. 2015 IEEE
Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, Helsinki, Finland, 2015, pp.
934–941.
M. Shao, J. Fan, and Y. Li, An empirical study on
consumer acceptance of mobile payment based on the
perceived risk and trust, in Proc. 2014 Int. Cyber-Enabled
Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery Conf.,
Shanghai, China, 2014, pp. 312–317.
H. Jiang, Study on mobile e-commerce security payment
system, in Proc. 2008 Int. Electronic Commerce and
Security Symposium, Guangzhou, China, 2008, pp. 754–
757.
C. Wang, The solution design using USB key for
network security authentication, in Proc. 4th Int.
Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks
Conf., Mathura, India, 2012, pp. 766–769.
I. Turk and A. Cosar, An open, NFC enabler independent
Mobile payment and identification method: NFC feature
box, in Proc. 17th Int. A World of Wireless, Mobile and
Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM) Symposium, Coimbra,
Portugal, 2016, pp. 1–3.
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